In a ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) scheme, a user may have multiple attributes, and each attribute may be shared simultaneously by many users. The decryption key of an attribute can thus be shared by many users who all possess the attribute. For monetary gain, a malicious authorized user may reveal his/her decryption key to a third party, and it is difficult to trace the owner of primitive secret key from an exposed key. At the same time, this situation may also limit commercial applications of CP-ABE systems. To solve these problems and enable fine-grained access control for the encrypted data, we propose a traceable CP-ABE scheme with attribute-level user revocation for cloud storage (TUR-CPABE). Our scheme enjoys four advantages. First, it has the ability to trace malicious users who have leaked key information from the system. Second, it supports attributelevel user revocation for malicious users and allows ABE fine-grained access control. Third, it allows secret key updates and ciphertext updates to resist collusion attacks between users. Fourth, outsourcing encryption, decryption and attribute revocation are used to reduce the computational burden on data owners, data users and the trust authority, respectively. In addition, our scheme has been proven to be secure against chosen plaintext attacks under a selective access policy based on decisional q -BDHE assumption in the standard model.
Introduction
In a cloud storage system, the cloud server must be able to provide data storage and other services for end users. Increasingly, companies and individuals prefer to store their valuable data in cloud servers due to limited equipment resources and the need to process big data. Due to security and privacy concerns, data owners always encrypt their data before outsourcing it to the cloud server. Encrypting data is a valid way to prevent information leakage, but encrypting messages hampers the sharing of messages with fine-grained access control. To solve this problem, Sahai and Waters [1] proposed the concept of attribute-based encryption (ABE), which can provide a "one-to-many" encryption scheme with fine-grained access control.
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Our contribution
Scheme [25] only considered trace malicious users, and scheme [29] can support attributelevel user revocation. Inspired by [25] and [29] , we provide a traceable ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption scheme with attribute-level user revocation for cloud storage (TUR-C-PABE). Our main contributions are as follows.
1. In this paper, we formally propose the definition of a traceable ciphertext-policy attributebased encryption scheme with attribute-level user revocation for cloud storage. In our scheme, we adopt linear secret sharing schemes (LSSS) as an access structure. This provides attribute-level user revocation for malicious user and fine-grained access control for ABE. In our scheme, the trust authority can trace defectors and send the identity of a defector to the attribute manager. The attribute manager is responsible for revoking the defector's attributes and updating the related decryption key and ciphertext. A user in the system could decrypt ciphertext successfully if and only if his/her identity was absent from the revocation list and his/her attributes can satisfy the access policy.
2. In the scheme, we distribute the identity of each user on a leaf node in the KEK tree. We can revoke a user by revoking his/her attributes. When the attribute manager revokes a malicious user's attribute i, it will update i's users group G i and the corresponding group key GSK, re-encrypted ciphertext CT 0 and the header of the message Hdr. Thus, our scheme can resist collusion attacks between users.
3. In the proposed scheme, outsourcing encryption, decryption and attribute revocation are used to reduce the computational burden of data owners, users and trust authority, respectively. Moreover, the experimental results show that the time spent in the decryption phase is constant.
4. The scheme is proven to be secure against a chosen plaintext attack under decisional q -BDHE assumption in the standard model.
Related work
Sahai and Waters first presented the concept of ABE [1] , and then, the ideas of KP-ABE and CP-ABE were formally proposed by Goyal et al. in [3] . After that, many cryptography researchers focused on KP-ABE and CP-ABE schemes [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] . In 2007, Abdalla et al. [35] proposed a traitor trace identity-based encryption scheme, and that was the original work on traitor tracing. In 2011, Wang et al. [36] presented another traitor tracing ABE scheme that can recognize a user's identity. This scheme could employ the technique of betrayer tracing and combine with a security coding technique to ensure the identity of the key abuser. Subsequently, Ning [37] proposed a traceable CP-ABE scheme; this scheme can catch malicious users effectively. A commitment scheme is used to trace defectors, but the method does not support the malicious user revocation.
To expand the commercial applications of ABE systems and combine them with user revocation mechanisms, Liu [38] presented a white-box traceable dynamic ABE scheme. The scheme can support user revocation and outsourcing decryption. However, it can neither resist collusion attacks between users nor support key and ciphertext updates. Jiang [39] proposed a traceable CP-ABE scheme that can resist key abuse. A betrayer who wants to leak a decryption key must abandon the whole key and give an exclusive dummy attribute set. Yang [40] presented a traceable scheme supporting search encryption and user revocation; it can perform efficient keyword search and provides fine-grained access control for encrypted data. At the same time, a large proportion of cryptographic computing is being outsourced to the cloud server, and this alleviates the computational burden on end-user devices. Zhang et al. [41] used a composite order bilinear group to construct an effective white-box traceable CP-ABE scheme with a large universe and multiple authorities. Although this scheme can be used to trace malicious users and resist collusion attacks between users, it cannot support malicious user revocation.
Organization
The remainder of our paper is summarized as follows. We provide some necessary background knowledge that will be applied to our scheme in Section 2. We describe the system model and security model of our scheme in Section 3. We present a TUR-CPABE scheme and the proof of its security based on security games in Section 4 and 5, respectively. In Section 6, we provide a theoretical performance analysis of our scheme. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 7.
Preliminaries
In this section, we give some necessary background information used in our scheme, including information about bilinear maps, binary trees, access structures and complexity assumptions.
Bilinear maps
Let G and G T be two multiplication cyclic groups of prime order p, and g be a generator of G.
A map e : G Â G G T ! is a bilinear map [42] with the following properties: 
Access structure
Definition 1 (Access structure [43] ). Let P = {P 1 ,P 2 ,Á Á Á,P n } be a set of parties. A collection A 2 P is called monotone for 8B,C: if B 2 A and B C then C 2 A. An (monotone) access structure is a (monotone) collection A of non-empty subsets of P, i.e.,A 2 P f0g. The sets in A are called the authorized sets, or else the sets are called the unauthorized sets. In this paper, we only consider the monotone access structure.
Linear secret sharing scheme
Definition 2 (linear secret sharing scheme (LSSS) [43] ). A LSSS over a group of parties P can be defined as follows:
1. The shares for each party from a vector over Z p .
2. For a LSSS, there is a matrix M with l rows and n columns referred to as the share generating matrix. For i 2 [1,l], we define a function ρ that labels the i-th row of matrix M as attribute ρ(i). We consider a column vector v = (s,v 2 ,v 3 ,. . .,v n ), where s 2 Z p is a secret value to be shared and we choose random v 2 ; v 3 ; . . . ; v n 2 Z p . Then Mv is the vector of l shares of the secret s, and the share (Mv) i belongs to attribute ρ(i).
Each LSSS in the above definition also enjoys the linear reconstruction property, defined as follows: Let A be an access structure for the LSSS and S 2 A be any authorized sets, and let I {1,2,. . .,l} be defined as I = {i: ρ(i) 2 S}. There exists a set of constants {ω i |i 2 I} such that 
Binary tree
Definition 3 (Binary tree [44] ). We denote U be a group of users in the system, a user u k 2 Uð1 k jUjÞ and G x U be users group for attribute x. We describe the binary tree below:
1. We assign a user u k for every leaf node and allocate a unique value v j for every node in the tree.
2. We define path(i) as a Dijkstra from the root node to the node i.
3. The minimal covering set node(G x ) is the minimal set of nodes, and it is able to cover all of the leaf nodes that have users connected in G x . 
Complexity assumptions
Now we briefly introduce the l-Strong Diffie-Hellman (l − SDH) assumption and the q-Bilinear Diffie-Hellman exponent (q − BDHE) assumption. Assumption 1 (l − SDH assumption [24] ). Let G be a bilinear group of prime order p and let g be a generator of G. A l − SDH problem can be described as follows: Randomly choose exponent 
Definition 5. We say that the q − BDHE assumption holds if no polynomial time algorithm A has a non-negligible advantage in solving the q − BDHE problem.
System model
In this section, we first account the system architecture of TUR-CPABE and then provide the formal definition and security model of TUR-CPABE.
System architecture
As shown in Fig 2, the system architecture of the TUR-CPABE scheme has the following six entities.
Trust authority (TA): TA can produce the public parameters and the master key, and it is in charge of distributing private keys to users in the system. In our scheme, the TA is fully trusted.
Attribute manager (AM): The AM has users groups for every attribute, and it generates the manager public key, the manager master key and the group key for the users in each group. In addition, AM is responsible for re-encrypting local ciphertext, updating the key, updating the ciphertext and obtaining an attribute revocation list.
Data owner (DO): The DO takes charge of defining the access policy, encrypting data under the access policy and uploading the local ciphertext to the attribute manager.
Data user (DU): This is an entity who wants to access outsourced data. A user in the system can decrypt the ciphertexts successfully if and only if his/her identity is absent from the revocation list and his/her attributes can satisfy the access policy.
Cloud server provider (CSP): We suppose that a CSP is honest but curious. In other words, it can execute every authorization request honestly but it obtains as much information as possible in the process and from the result.
Outsourcing decryption server provider (ODSP): The server can provide outsourcing decryption service for the user to generate a partially decrypted ciphertext.
Formal definition
A TUR-CPABE involves eight algorithms: system setup, manager setup, key generation, encryption, decryption, key sanity check, trace and update. System setup (λ,U)!(PP,MSK): TA runs this algorithm. The algorithm inputs the security parameter λ as well as the attributes universe U in the system, and it outputs the public parameters PP and the master key MSK.
Manager setup (PP)!(MPK,MMK): AM runs this algorithm. The algorithm inputs the public parameters PP, and it outputs the manager public key MPK and the manager master key MMK.
Key generation (PP,MSK,MPK,MMK,S,id)!SK: In this algorithm, a decryption key SK consists of the user private key USK produced by the TA and the group key GSK generated by the AM. The algorithm inputs the public parameters PP, the master key MSK, the manager public key MPK, the manager master key MMK, a user's identity id as well as an attributes set S, then it outputs the user private key USK and the group key GSK.
Encryption (PP,MPK,m(M,ρ))!(Hdr,CT 0 ): The algorithm inputs the public parameters PP, the manager public key MPK, a message m and an access policy (M,ρ), then it outputs the Traceable CP-ABE scheme with attribute level user revocation re-encrypted ciphertext CT 0 and the header of message Hdr. This algorithm is performed by the AM and the DO.
Decryption (PP,CT 0 ,Hdr,SK)!m: This algorithm is carried out by the DU and the ODSP. The algorithm inputs the public parameters PP, the re-encrypted ciphertext CT 0 , the header of the message Hdr and the decryption key SK. The algorithm outputs plaintext m if and only if the user's identity is absent from the revocation list and his/her attributes can satisfy the access policy.
Key sanity check (PP,SK)!1 or 0: TA performs this algorithm. If a user's decryption key SK is suspected, then it must be determined whether it is a well-formed decryption key by means of the key sanity check. If SK cannot pass the key sanity check, it outputs 0. Otherwise, it outputs 1.
Trace (PP,SK)! id or ?: TA runs this algorithm. If a user's decryption key SK is a wellformed decryption key, then TA sends his/her identity id to the AM. Finally, the AM revokes the attribute for the malicious user.
Update ðCT 0 ; Hdr; GSK; RLÞ ! ðCT 0 ; Hdr ; GSK; RL 0 Þ: AM can perform attribute revocation for the malicious user, add the malicious user's id and revoke the attribute into the revocation list to get a new revocation list RL 0 . Finally, the AM inputs the group key GSK, the reencrypted ciphertext CT 0 and the header of message Hdr to obtain the updated CT 0 , Hdr and GSK.
Security model
In this section, we propose the security model for our TUR-CPABE system.
Traceability.
In this subsection, we present a traceability definition of our TUR-C-PABE system. We describe it by considering a security game between an adversary A and a simulator B as follows:
Initialization: Simulator B executes System setup (λ,U) as well as Manager setup (PP) to obtain the public parameters PP and the manager public key MPK. After that, B sends PP as well as MPK to A.
Key query: A submits a series of attributes sets (id 1 ,S 1 ),. . .,(id q ,S q ) to request the corresponding decryption keys, where (u i ,x) 2 RL (it denotes revoke attribute x for user u i whose identity is id i ) or 
Construction of TUR-CPABE
In our scheme, user's decryption key consists of two parts. One is the user private key USK related to his/her attributes set, and the other is the group key GSK related to users group he/ she belongs to. Only by combining the corresponding USK and GSK is the user able to decrypt the ciphertext. In the proposed scheme, the encryption algorithm also has two steps: First, the data owner encrypts the message to obtain the local ciphertext. Then, the attribute manager re-encrypts the local ciphertext to gain the re-encrypted ciphertext and the header of the message, and the attribute manager uploads them to the cloud server provider. A user can decrypt the ciphertext when and only when the user's identity id is absent from a revocation list and his/her attributes can satisfy the access policy. In addition, our decryption algorithm can be stated as follows: the outsourcing decryption server provider performs the outsourcing decryption algorithm and then sends the partially decrypted ciphertext to users; and users execute the local decryption algorithm to recover the plaintext.
System setup (λ,U)!(PP,MSK): The algorithm inputs the security parameter λ and the attributes universe U = {1,2,. . .,x,. . .,n}. Let G and G T be two multiplication cyclic groups of prime order p, g be a generator of G. Function e : G Â G ! G T is a bilinear map. As shown in Fig 1, T is a binary KEK tree, and for every leaf node in the tree to assign a user u whose identity is id. RL = {(id,x)} is a revocation list (The initial is empty); this denotes the revoke attribute x for user u. The TA performs the following algorithms.
1. Randomly choose a; a 2 Z p and h 2 G.
For every attribute
3. TA chooses a probabilistic encryption scheme (Enc,Dec) [45] 
b. TA randomly selects z 2 Z p Ã and sets the transformation key TK k as
and u k 's user private key USK k is set as
d. TA retains GSK k , then it sends USK k to the user and GSK k to the AM by the secure channel, respectively.
2. GSK generation: Every node in the tree is assigned an exclusive value v j and an exclusive sequence number sequence(v j ). For the user u k 2 Uð1 k jUjÞ, AM produces a group KEK x that can compute path nodes from a leaf node to the root node. The detailed algorithm is as follows:
a. For each attribute x 2 S k (1 x |U|), AM computes a minimal covering set node(G x ) for G x and defines a Dijkstra path(u k ) for the user u k 2 Uð1 k jUjÞ, where G x is the users group for attribute x.
3. AM sends GSK k to the user and G x to the TA by the secure channel, respectively. Then, the user u k obtains an unbroken decryption key
Encryption (PP,MPK,m,(M,ρ))!(Hdr,CT 0 ): This algorithm has two steps. First, the user owner DO encrypts the message m to obtain the local ciphertext CT. Then, AM re-encrypts CT to produce the re-encrypted ciphertext CT 0 and the header of the message Hdr. The specific process is as follows:
1. DO encrypts: The algorithm inputs the public parameters PP, the message m and an access policy (M,ρ). M is a matrix with l × n elements, and function ρ maps the rows of M into the attributes set. Then, the DO chooses a random column vector ν = (s,ν 2 ,ν 3 ,. . .,ν n ), where ν 2 , ν 3 ,. . .,ν n are applied to share s. DO computes 
For 8i Key sanity check (PP,SK)!1 or 0: If the user u k 's decryption key SK k is suspected, TA will check whether user private key USK k satisfies the key sanity check:
If USK k can pass the key sanity check, the algorithm outputs 1. Otherwise, it outputs 0. In an ABE scheme, a user has multiple attributes. Usually, each attribute can be shared by many users. Thus, the decryption key of an attribute can be shared by many users. When the user u k 's attribute x is revoked, we can update other unrevoked users corresponding to GSK x . In the meantime, we need to update the ciphertext related to this attribute to make sure the user's decryption key connected to the attribute is useless. Thus, the user u k loses his/her decryption privilege. The attribute revocation algorithm includes the following steps. 
Security analysis
In this section, we first provide a proof of traceability based on the l − SDH hardness assumption. Then, we prove that our scheme is able to achieve IND−CPA security if the q − BDHE assumption holds.
Traceability
Theorem 1. Suppose that q < l, our TUR-CPABE system is traceable if l − SDH assumption holds. Where q is the number of key queries that the attacker makes. Proof: Suppose there is a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary A capable of winning this traceability game with advantage ε, w.l.o.g., suppose l = q + 1, we can establish a PPT algorithm B to break the l − SDH hardness problem with a non-negligible advantage.
Let G and G T be two multiplication cyclic groups of prime order p, let g be a generator of G and let function e : G Â G ! G T be a bilinear map. 
2. B randomly picks a; y 2 Z p ; h 2 G. 
and B randomly selects z; r 0 ; r x 0 2 Z p , computes DSK i related to (id i ,S i ) as follows: First, B com-
Then B sets the transformation key TK i as
and builds the user private key as
To define a function node(G x ) for attribute x's users group G x , where x 2 S i . For every user u i 2 Uð1 i jUjÞ, B defines a function path(u i ) and performs an intersection operation 
where r 2 Z p is unknown, and let K 1 =z, where z 2 Z p Ã . According to the equality e(L 2 ,g) = e(L 1 ,g a ) from the key sanity check, we have L 2 = g ar . On the basis of the equal-
Then B continues performing the following algorithm.
At present, we assess the superiority of B to break the l − SDH hardness problem. Suppose z denotes the event that (c r ,ω r ) is the solution to the l − SDH hardness problem and this solution can be checked by verifying whether the equality eðg a Á g c r ; o r Þ ¼ eðg ; g Þ holds. When B randomly selects (c r ,ω r ), z can happen with a negligible advantage. We denote this as 0 for simplicity. When the event Awin^gcdðg À 1; pÞ ¼ 1 occurs, B outputs a tuple (c r ,ω r ) and the probability of tuple (c r ,ω r ) satisfies the equality eðg a Á g c r ; o r Þ ¼ eðg ; g Þ is 1. Hence, the possibility of B solves l − SDH challenge problem is as follows:
IND − CPA security of the TUR-CPABE
Theorem 2. If the decisional q − BDHE assumption holds, then there are no PPT adversaries that have non-negligible advantages in breaking our TUR-CPABE scheme under selective access policy and chosen plaintext attacks, where q > 2jUj À 2 and jUj is the number of users in the system. Proof: Suppose there is a PPT adversary A able to break our TUR-CPABE scheme with an advantage ε. In this case, we could set up a simulator B who has an advantage ε/2 to break the decisional q − BDHE hardness problem. The simulation processes are described as follows:
Let G and G T be two multiplication cyclic groups of prime order p, g be a generator of G and function e : G Â G ! G T be a bilinear map. 
. Then, the simulator performs the following algorithm to setting decryption key.
1. B computes USK 0 as follows:
2. Choose a random exponent z 2 Z p , then let K 1 = z and set TK as
Finally, obtain USK = (z,TK).
For have been revoked attribute
x , then computes a minimal covering set node(G x ) for the attribute x's users group G x and defines a Dijkstra path(u) for the user u, finally performs an intersection operation β x = node(G x ) \ path(u). If β x = ϕ, B does not compute KEK x for u.
responds in the following.
Find a vector
, such a vector must exist.
2. B selects a random number c; r x 0 2 Z p , builds
3. B chooses a random number t 2 Z p , implicit defines
0 are as follows:
For 8x 2 S, B computes K x,2 0 . If there no exists i such that ρ
5.
B chooses a random exponent z 2 Z p Ã , then builds K 1 = z. Compute the transformation key 
Third, B computes
Finally, B sets the local ciphertext as CT
Re-encryption: For each non-revoked attribute ρ
Then, B re-encrypts the local ciphertext to obtain
In addition, for every ρ Ã (i)(1 i l Ã ) corresponding to the attribute x, B computes a minimal covering set node(G x ) for x's users group G x . Then, B sets the header of message as
Finally, B sends the challenge ciphertext <Hdr υ Ã ,CT υ Ã > to A. Phase 2: Same as Phase 1. Guess: Finally, A outputs a guess υ 0 of υ. If υ 0 = υ, the simulator outputs μ 0 = 0 to show that T is a valid q − BDHE tuple. Otherwise, B outputs μ 0 = 1 to indicate that T is a random group element from G T .
The decryption key and public parameters generated by simulations in the above game are the same as those in the real system.
When μ = 1, the adversary cannot acquire any information about υ. Therefore, we have
þ ε. The advantage of simulator B in the decisional q − BDHE game is defined as:
Performance Analysis
In this section, our scheme is compared with several related schemes in terms of functionality and performance. The comparisons are listed in Tables 1and 2. Our experiment is realized by using of the Pairing Cryptography (PBC) library [46] . Our pairing is structured on an ellipse curve y 2 = x 3 + x in a finite field F q (q is a prime number and q 3 mod 4). The environment of the hardware runtime is Intel Core i5-3470 CPU @ 3.20GHz, and RAM is 4.00GB. The software runtime environment is JDK 1.7.5, JPBC 2.0.0 and MyEclipse 10. We compared our scheme with the other schemes [25, 26, 37, 38, 41] in Table 1 . Those scheme can support traceability, and schemes [25, 37, 41] cannot support malicious user revocation. To achieve ABE fine-grained access control, our scheme can sustain the attribute level user revocation. In addition, we find that schemes [26, 41] and our scheme both can resist collusion attacks between users. Only scheme [38] and our scheme can support an outsourcing decryption algorithm. Finally, Table 1 shows that our scheme can obtain a key update algorithm and a ciphertext update algorithm, and schemes [25, 26, 37, 38, 41] do not possess those functionalities.
From Table 2 , we can find that our scheme is more efficient than those in [25, 26, 37, 38, 41 ] for the encryption algorithm. As our scheme only conducts one exponentiation operation and one multiplication operation in the decryption algorithm, our scheme and scheme [38] are much better than are other schemes [25, 26, 37, 41] . In the trace algorithm, it is obvious that the schemes in [25, 37, 38] are less efficient than our scheme, and due to the cost of multiplication operations, it is much less expensive than a bilinear pairing operation so that our scheme is slightly lower in efficiency than that of the scheme [41] . Although our scheme is more efficient than are those schemes in [25, 26, 38, 41] for the key generation algorithm, it is slightly less efficient than scheme [37] . It is worth noting that our scheme can perform the attribute-level user revocation and can resist collusion attacks with a lower key generation expenditure. Fig 3 compares the computational overheads in key generation time, encryption time, decryption time and trace time. Fig 3(A) compares key generation times between our scheme and the above schemes. We find that the key generation time in the proposed scheme is much less than that in other schemes [25, 26, 38, 41] . Fig 3(B) shows the time required for the data owner to encrypt a message. Our scheme takes much less time than that of the others [25, 26, 37, 38, 41] . Fig 3(C) shows the time required for the data user to decrypt a message. Because our scheme and scheme [38] make use of outsourcing decryption algorithm, the decryption time is a constant. Compared with schemes [25, 26, 37, 41] , our scheme has an obvious advantages in the decryption time. Fig 3(D) compares the trace times in the above scheme. Our scheme's trace time is much less than those of other schemes [25, 37, 38] . Compared with scheme [41] , although our scheme does not have a clear advantage in its trace time, our scheme can achieve user revocation and can resist user collusion. In brief, the results of our experiment agree with the above theoretical analysis. Traceable CP-ABE scheme with attribute level user revocation
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a scheme called traceable CP-ABE with attribute-level user revocation for cloud storage (TUR-CPABE). In our construction, a user's decryption key and ciphertext both have two parts. A secret key update and a ciphertext update are used to resist collusion attacks between users. In addition, outsourcing encryption, decryption and attribute revocation are used to reduce the computational burden of data owners, users and the trust authority, respectively. Finally, the security of our scheme is demonstrated under a chosen plaintext attack based on a decisional q − BDHE hardness problem in the standard model.
Because a black-box traceable tool is much better than a white-box traceable tool, our future work will focus on constructing a black-box traceable CP-ABE tool with attribute-level user revocation.
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